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1Canada’s Monetary Choices in North America and Britain’s in Europe -  
Economic Parallels and Political Differences *
by
  David Laidler
   Bank of Montreal Professor, University of Western Ontario 
   Scholar in Residence, C. D. Howe Institute 
Abstract:  There are strong economic arguments in favour of one money for one market, but
multiple currencies continue to exist because of network externalities supported by national legal
restrictions. The national currencies of Canada and Britain will not vanish spontaneously as the
result of market forces, but they could be eliminated by acts of policy. Each country currently
faces a choice between competing monetary orders, and in each of them the status quo, based on
a national currency and inflation targeting, is working rather well; but the alternatives available
are very different. Britain can join an already functioning European monetary order that is a
component of a broader and still evolving political order, and its choice  must ultimately depend
upon its electorate’s degree of trust in domestic versus European monetary institutions. The
United States have no interest in sharing authority over their own monetary arrangements with
Canada, let alone with a new supra-national central bank, so the choice facing the Canadian
electorate is between the status quo and unilateral dollarization, a monetary order that is clearly
inferior on both economic and political grounds.    
* This paper was presentated at a conference on “Britain and Canada and their Large
Neighbouring Monetary Unions” to be held at the University of Victoria, Victoria BC, on
October 17-18 2003. It draws heavily on the author’s earlier work on proposals for North
American monetary integration, much of which was carried out at the C. D. Howe Institute in
collaboration with Bill Robson, Finn Poschmann and Shay Aba, who are nevertheless not to be
blamed for any errors and omissions in what follows. 
2Basic Issues
At first sight the monetary choices now facing Canada and Britain have much in common. Each
country has the option of abandoning its domestic currency for that of a larger neighbour, and for
each the choice in question hinges on similar economic and political considerations. On the
economic front for example, the cost reductions in trans-border transactions that a common
currency would yield play off against the loss in flexibility in the face of shocks to the economy
that giving up a separate currency with a flexible exchange rate is claimed to confer; and on the
political front, questions of national sovereignty and the democratic accountability of policy
makers attract attention. 
Even so,  the pros and cons of currency unification in particular, and monetary union
more generally, play out very differently in the two cases. Their economic elements have points
in common, as I shall show below, but their politics are fundamentally different, as I shall also
argue. Should it adopt the Euro, Britain would become an equal partner in a monetary system
that forms part of a supra-national political organisation of which it is already a full member.
Monetary union in North America, on the other hand, would see the government of Canada
yielding important policy powers to the Federal Reserve System, an agency of the United States
government, which is now, and would remain, accountable solely to the people of the United
States through the Congress. I shall conclude, therefore, that it is quite inappropriate to use
blanket analogies with Britain’s choice vis-a-vis the Euro in discussing the desirability of
Canada seeking membership in an integrated North American monetary system. Each case must
ultimately be judged on its local merits.              
Some Economic Fundamentals   
From the point of view of economic fundamentals, there is a strong case to be made that the right
number of monies is one. What we call “the market” is a collection of institutions that establish
property rights in goods and services, both currently available and promised for the future, and
facilitate their exchange. For many purposes economists find it helpful to analyse market
exchanges “as if” they take place on a multilateral basis, at prices which guarantee the
continuous equality of supply and demand for all items, and costlessly into the bargain, but this
is no more than a useful (often very useful) fiction. Trade is, typically, a series of bilateral acts,
each involving the exchange of some specific item against one that is a commonly acceptable, to
which we usually attach the label “money”. It also takes place at prices set by market
participants in terms of that means of exchange, which then becomes the economy’s unit of
account. To the extent that trade involves the exchange of currently available goods and services
for claims to goods and services in the future,  money usually functions as a standard of deferred
1Textbook expositions usually stress money’s function as a store of value. I here
deliberately hark back to a pre-Keynesian way of thinking about money that focusses on its role
in what Jevons (1875) called “the mechanism of exchange”.  Theories of money that treat it
solely as an asset, such as the “over-lapping generations” model, are, from this standpoint,
inherently defective. Nevertheless, as Benjamin Cohen has pointed out to me, in a store of value
role, a single money is inferior to many because of the extra degree of portfolio diversification
that the latter arrangement permits. 
2Modern models of money that stress trust owe a great deal to Carl Menger (1892), while
those that stress legal restrictions hark back to the Chartalism of Georg Friedrich Knapp (1921)
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payment too.1 
In these roles, the use by all market participants of a commonly acceptable item reduces
the cost of doing business. As far as actual transactions are concerned, if everyone stands ready
to offer and accept the same single money, then partners for trade in any specific item are easier
to find, and if all prices are stated in terms of that single money the structure of prices becomes
more immediately transparent, computation costs are reduced, as is the scope for making errors.
To take a market that is using a single money, and then to add a second, or a third, and so on, is
simply to increase the number transactions and computations that need to be made to support a
given volume of trade in goods and services, and hence to make their execution gratuitously
more costly.     
It is from considerations such as these that the well known slogan “one market - one
money” derives its intellectual force, and they also pose a problem for monetary historians who
need to explain how it is that the world we live in departs so far from this single money ideal.
Two concepts that run through the academic discussion of these matters require our attention
here: first, once established in circulation, any money is then supported by a mutual trust in the
prospect that it will continue to be acceptable among the agents that use it; and second,
particularly in the modern world, the effects of such trust are re-enforced by legal restrictions
imposed by governments and the courts on what does and does not serve to discharge debts, not
least tax-debts, and, closely related, on the way in which agents, particularly business
enterprises, keep and report their accounts.2 The extent to which legal restrictions have been
responsible in and of themselves for the creation and maintenance of separate national
currencies, as opposed to codifying arrangements based on trust that had already emerged among
the inhabitants of particular regions, is much debated, but this debate does not matter for the
issue at hand. What is important here is that both the Canadian dollar and the pound sterling are
maintained in circulation by the network externalities that trust creates, and that these are
3An extreme version of this view informs the analysis of Dr. Sherry Cooper (2001), and
Richard Harris (2001) has also flirted with it.
4See for example Murray and Powell (2002)
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supported by local legal restrictions too.
This conclusion enables us to dispose at the outset of this paper of an argument that is
certainly sometimes heard in Canada, though I am not aware of its having figured in British
debates; namely, that, as economies become more open and trading becomes more
internationalised, minor currencies (such as the Canadian dollar) will simply disappear from use
as individual agents come to recognise the transactions costs that can be saved by their adopting
a more widely accepted and acceptable alternative.3 It is true that there are example of
economies that have spontaneously adopted a foreign currency for domestic use, experienced
market dollarization, as the commonly used phrase would have it. Market dollarization,
however, has never occurred as the outcome of competition between a large and a small currency
when the latter has been well managed. It has invariable been the consequence of instability in
the minor currency’s domestic purchasing power brought about by high and unstable inflation,
and what is surprising is how infrequent and incomplete market dollarization has been, even
under such extreme circumstances.
In this context, it is interesting to note that anecdotal evidence of the onset of voluntary
dollarization in Canada in the face of the Canadian dollar’s sharp depreciation against its US
counterpart in the late 1990s was sometimes cited to support the case for having the Canadian
government move quickly to abandon its currency while conditions remained relatively
favourable. This evidence, however,  turns out to be have been anecdotal indeed, and grossly
exaggerated by those who cited it, as recent research by the Bank of Canada has demonstrated.4
At the same time, however,  though network externalities seem to be decisive in helping
to keep an already existing national currency in place, provided it remains stable, they are not all
powerful. Those who feared that a lack of trust on the part of the general public in the new and
untried Euro might undermine its viability upon its launch in 1999 were proved wrong. The
Euro’s success has clearly established that network externalities can be overcome by a carefully
designed change in the legal restrictions that impinge upon the monetary system, albeit
particularly, one suspects, if that change is designed to preserve continuity with certain key
features of the monetary system that went before it. It was surely, that is to say, a wise decision
to make the European Central Bank look as much like the Bundesbank as was decently possible.
5The following few paragraphs draw heavily on Laidler (1999) and (forthcoming)
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The moral of all this for the monetary choices that currently face Canada and Britain is
straightforward. There is no point in waiting for the Canadian dollar and the pound sterling to
vanish of their own accords. Short of the implementation of domestic policies calculated to
create hyper-inflation, that is not going to happen. On the other hand, there is no reason to
believe that there are any obstacles, rooted in the nature of the monetary system, to the adoption
by Canada of the US dollar, or by Britain of the Euro. Both currencies are already highly
credible and well known to agents in the countries in question. Even so, choosing the time at
which to join a larger monetary system, not to mention setting the exchange rate at which to
convert the currency, do pose serious technical difficulties. East Germany’s premature adoption
of the Deutschmark at a grossly over-valued parity shows all too clearly how easy it is to make
serious mistakes in managing these transitional matters. But transitional issues are just that, they
can be resolved, and they should not weigh heavily, if at all, in the underlying choice. 
Choosing a Monetary Order
The choices that face Canada and Britain need to be formulated properly if they are to be
analysed usefully. I will let those who know more about the British debate speak for themselves
on this matter, but in Canada the issue at stake is all too often stated dangerously narrowly, as
involving the potential replacement of a flexible exchange rate regime with the limiting case of a
fixed exchange rate on the US dollar, namely the adoption of that currency as Canada’s own.
Much more than the exchange rate regime is at stake in such a choice however. It is properly
posed as lying between alternative monetary orders.5
By the phrase monetary order, I mean an arrangement that involves four sets of
characteristics, namely:  A goal or array of goals for monetary policy; an institutional and policy
making framework which supports the achievement of those goals; the beliefs of the public at
large about the capacity of the order to achieve its goals; and the political mechanisms through
which the public is able both to influence the choice of goals, and to hold accountable for their
performance those charged with the task of achieving them.
At present Canada and Britain possess national monetary orders that differ in many
details, but are remarkably similar in broad outline. In each country, the goal of monetary policy
is to achieve low and stable inflation. The central banks of both countries are, that is to say,
formal inflation targeters. Each country has also conferred upon its central bank the necessary
technical powers to implement monetary policy, each one also has in place a fiscal regime that
puts no undue pressure on the central bank to monetise government debt, and crucially, each one
6has in place a flexible exchange rate regime, which enables conflicts between the  goal of
monetary policy and anything that might be happening either to price level behaviour abroad, or
that might effect the country’s real exchange rate, to be absorbed by a movement in the nominal
price of the domestic currency in terms of its foreign counterpart. Furthermore, because these
arrangements are compatible with gearing monetary policy to the pursuit of low inflation, and
because both central banks have by and large been successful in achieving their policy goal, the
latter enjoys considerable credibility among the public at large. 
When it comes to the political component of their monetary orders, however, some
differences arise between the two countries. In Britain, the goal of policy, the inflation target, is
set solely by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is accountable to Parliament for that choice,
and through Parliament to the electorate. In Canada the target is set jointly by the Minister of
Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Canada, and their discussions of this matter are subject
to the local dual responsibility doctrine. Hence, though ultimate responsibility for the choice of
the target lies with the Minister as it does in Britain, the Bank of Canada plays an active role in
setting it, and a Governor who found himself in disagreement with the Minister over this matter
would have the option of triggering a precise and public directive to follow the latter’s orders, an
event which would be followed by the Governor’s resignation. 
Both the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada are independent when it comes to the
day by day conduct of monetary policy. Even so, in Britain, policy choices are made by a
Monetary Policy Committee to which the Chancellor makes direct appointments, whereas in
Canada they are made by an informal Governing Council of the Bank only two of whose
members hold positions that are subject even to Cabinet ratification. This suggests that political
oversight of the technical competence with which policy is executed might be a little more
detailed and exacting in Britain, though the activities of both Banks are subject to scrutiny by
Parliamentary committees and each has its own elaborate communications strategies to ensure
that the electorate at large is kept well informed about monetary policy.
Over the last decade or so, The Canadian and British economies alike have performed
well under their current monetary orders, which seem to be both coherent and compatible with
the liberal political orders of which they form a part. This is true both by international standards,
but particularly when the basis of comparison is these two countries’ own earlier experience.
These considerations have important implications for the way in which the pros and cons of
monetary union are discussed in both cases. 
7To begin with, it is clear that in each country, exchange rate flexibility is a purely
permissive device that enables a particular monetary policy goal to be pursued. Each of them
became an inflation targeter in the early 1990s, having adopted flexible exchange rates much
earlier, at the beginning of the 1970s. In the 1970s and ‘80s, furthermore, each of them
sometimes pursued goals that were inappropriate for monetary policy, such as high real growth,
or mutually inconsistent, such as unsustainably low unemployment along with low inflation, or
sometimes simply unclear. Advocates of a supra-national monetary union (at least in Canada)
sometimes cite this earlier experience as counting against the current monetary order, essentially
branding it as guilty by association with earlier experience. Such a line of argument is clearly
inappropriate. The monetary orders prevailing in Canada and Britain changed in the early 1990s,
and should be judged on the basis of experience only since then, and both are entitled to have an
“if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” defence mounted on their behalf as far as their economic outcomes
are concerned.
To insist on looking at the overall monetary order, rather than international monetary
arrangements per se, also forces us to pay attention to the political implications of the changes
that are being suggested. It is a commonplace these days that monetary policy is the single most
powerful component of macroeconomic policy more generally considered, and if it is not also a
commonplace that, in a liberal democracy, policy makers should be answerable for their actions
to the electorate that is affected by them, then it ought to be. This is not to argue for having day-
to-day monetary policy made by a free vote of back benchers, or even by  the Cabinet: we know
enough about the incentives inherent in electoral politics to mount a strong case that monetary
policy should be insulated from short-term pressures and treated similarly to the administration
of justice, or the management of the  news departments of public broadcasters. It is, however, to
argue that arrangements which ensure the  accountability of those who make monetary policy to
those who are affected by it are an important element by which any monetary order should be
judged.
The Economics of the Two Debates
Evidently, there must be a strong political element to any debate about alternative monetary
orders, and one that is, in the last analysis, difficult, if not impossible, entirely to separate from
economic questions. Even so, one cannot discuss everything at once, and it is helpful to divide
the issues at stake between those that are predominantly economic in nature from those that are
more political, and we begin here with the former.
6This estimate is drawn from Robson and Laidler (2002) It is small relative to estimates
of the savings to be realised by the Euro because North American monetary integration would
eliminate one currency, not nine. In this context it is worth noting that the creation of the Euro
has presumably already created substantial cost-savings for British firms dealing with Europe. 
7See in particular Frankel and Rose (2000, 2001)
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Transactions Costs. 
The strongest economic argument in favour of any monetary union has already been alluded to
above: namely, that it leads to fewer costs in international transactions. These begin with the
costs of buying and selling foreign exchange when goods, services and assets are traded across
national borders, and in the Canada-US case seem to amount to somewhere in the region of a
quarter of one per cent of gross domestic product.6 These costs, it might be noted stem from the
simple existence of a separate Canadian dollar, and would still be incurred under a fixed
exchange rate regime of any degree of “hardness”, including a currency board, and their
existence and magnitude constitutes one of many arguments against settling for any such
intermediate regime on anything but a transitional basis. 
In the case of a separate currency whose exchange rate is also flexible, however, to these
must be added the costs of hedging against future currency movements. Anyone engaged in
regular cross border transactions in which the passage of time is important is going to want to
undertake these, but I am unaware of any estimates of their costs, or of those incurred when less
formal longer-term hedging takes place, as, for example when a Canadian exporter finds it
prudent to undertake long-term borrowing abroad in order to finance the expansion of production
facilities in Canada, or when a firm sacrifices economies of scale in order to diversify its
production facilities across the boundaries of the currency areas in which it buys inputs and sells
output. All of these costs, whose significance I do not wish to downplay, are manifestations of
the simple point already made that, in one market, other things equal, the use of a single money
enables economic activity to be carried on at a lower cost than the use of more than one money.
Trade and Output Growth
The potential economic gains from monetary integration do not stop with lower transactions
costs, of course. Those costs inhibit trade, and their removal therefore encourages it. This
observation, which ought to be uncontroversial, has formed the starting point of an important
body of empirical work dealing with currency unions, to which the most visible contributor has
been Andrew Rose, writing with a number of co-authors, most notably Jeffrey Frankel.7 The
essential message of this work is that, just as currency unification encourages trade, so does trade
create higher income levels, and it appears to show that, on average, the income gains in
8See House of Commons (UK) (2003) for a discussion of a range of estimates and the
arguments for taking a cautious view of them in the UK case.  
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question are large. Indeed, extrapolating from Rose’s results, it has been suggested that the
creation of a Canada-US currency union might lead to as much as a thirty per cent rise in
Canadian living standards over a ten year period. Qualitatively similar claims have also been
made about the benefits for Britain of adopting the Euro, though, quantitatively speaking, on a
rather more modest level.8
Now empirical work in economics is inherently controversial, and not all well informed
commentators have found these estimates convincing. This is not the place to go into the details
of the debate.  Suffice it to note that there are two links in the causative chain at work here, that
between currency unification and trade, and that between trade and output, and that the second of
these is particularly problematic in the current context. No one would deny that, when heavily
protected, even essentially autarchic, economies have opened up to trade, spectacular gains to
living standards have followed. The example of the Asian “tigers” is well known. But there are
good reasons to believe that here, as in many other places in economic life, diminishing returns
are eventually to be expected. Canada and Britain are already extremely open to trade, and if the
transactions costs associated with maintaining separate currencies are indeed preventing its
further expansion, that must be in areas where the potential gains are small, for the simple reason
that the transactions costs inhibiting their exploitation are also small. 
Only if there are significant external economies of scale in the sectors affected, whose
exploitation cannot be ensured by the pursuit of private profit would this not be the case, and this
seems unlikely in the light of the available evidence. The NAFTA and its predecessor agreement
have now been in place for more than a decade and have generated a dramatic increase in
Canada-US trade, particularly in manufacturing. A recent study be Dan Trefler (2002) estimates
that the NAFTA has been responsible for productivity gains in the order of 6 per cent. in this
sector, though it also reveals significantly greater improvements in the sub-sectors most affected
by it. Improvements in economic performance of this magnitude have certainly been well worth
having, but it is hard to believe that further gains of four or five times their size are there for the
taking, particularly since Trefler finds little evidence of economies of scale having been
responsible for them. In any event, Europe is now in the process of generating as close as
economics usually gets to a controlled experiment on the benefits of monetary integration,
because three members of the EU have yet (and may never) adopt the Euro. Though it is early
days as yet, it is hard, even after four years, to discern any marked divergence in economic
9A recent time series study of the Irish economy by Thom and Walsh (2002) finds
essentially no effects on output growth associated with the break-up of the Anglo-Irish monetary
union. Note also that the start of the more Irish “economic miracle” antedates the launch of the
Euro and seems to be associated with Ireland’s membership in the EU as well as with the
adoption of an investment-friendly tax regime. 
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performance between the “Euro ins” and the “Euro outs”.9
All in all then, though it would be ridiculous to deny that economic benefits would arise
for both Britain and Canada from the lower transactions costs associated with monetary
integration, and misleading not to point out explicitly that estimates of the direct element of
those costs associated with the foreign exchange market per se put a rock bottom lower bound on
them, it would also pay to be cautious about their overall magnitude. No doubt the economic
gains from monetary integration are big enough to matter on an “other things equal” basis, but
other things are not always equal, and there are potentially offsetting losses that must also be
taken into consideration. 
The Question of “Flexibility” 
Just as fundamental as the proposition that one is the right number of monies, is the observation
that there would be no point in international trade, or inter-regional trade within a country for
that matter, if all areas produced and consumed a similar bundle of goods and services. The
productivity of trade derives precisely from the fact that there are differences among these, 
particularly, perhaps, among production bundles. 
It is in this context that issues having to do with the extra flexibility conferred upon a
country by a flexible exchange rate arise. They do because the so-called “law of one price”,
which says that - making due allowance for transportation costs and taxation differences - the
same good cannot trade at a different price in two parts of the same market, does not also say
that, where different regions produce different bundles of goods, the relative prices of these
bundles will not vary over time. On the contrary as tastes and technology, not to mention the
state of the business cycle, change, so will those relative prices, and so, therefore must the real
incomes in terms of consumption goods of the people who produce them.
Within a monetary union, and on the assumptions (made at this point for the sake of
simplicity) that the consumption bundle is more or less standard across regions and dominated
by goods that are easily traded, these real income changes must be brought about to an important
extent by variations in money wages. If these are flexible, all well and good, but if there is any
10Chen and Rogoff (2002) document the influence of commodity prices on the Australian,
Canadian and New Zealand exchange rates. Note that, since early 2003, the well known Bank of
Canada equation (Amano and Van Norden 1995), which has performed well since the early
1990s  in predicting the real Canadian-U.S dollar exchange rate as a function energy prices, non-
energy commodity prices, and the short term interest differential between the two countries, has
been seriously under-predicting this variable. It is too early as yet to say whether this is a
temporary aberration, a signal that some newly important fundamental variable is missing from
it, or evidence that the foreign exchange market is itself prone to generate exchange rate
misalignments for non-fundamental reasons. 
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stickiness to them, particularly downward stickiness, then, in areas where incomes must fall,
these changes will be accompanied by increases in unemployment which, though transitional,
will not necessarily be either small or short-lived. Now if the monetary union is also a fiscal
union, the tax-transfer system will work automatically to mitigate these effects, and if labour
mobility is relatively easy within it, so will movements of workers away from depressed and
towards buoyant regions. These conditions,  roughly speaking, characterise monetary unions
whose borders are co-terminus with those of a country, but more often than not, fiscal transfers
and labour mobility stop at the national boundary. 
How important all this might be for any country considering entry to a supra-national
monetary union depends, of course, upon the extent to which it is likely to be hit by shocks,
particularly adverse shocks, that are specific to the mix of traded goods that it produces. It is by
now reasonably well understood that Canada’s status as a major producer and exporter of
primary commodities, coupled with that of the United States as a significant importer thereof,
makes the country particularly vulnerable to such problems (and similar considerations seem to
arise in Britain from differences between its output mix and that of the major European
economies). It is also understood that a nominal exchange rate adjustment is one way of dealing
with them, not as a permanent fix that avoids real income adjustments, but as a means of
bringing those adjustments about without putting more transitional downward pressures on
money wages than they can comfortable bear. In the Canadian case,  an adverse shock to
commodity prices must reduce real wages in the sector that produces them, but also in other
sectors of the economy if they are to absorb the resources released from commodity production.
It must do this in any circumstances, but under a flexible exchange rate, part of the adjustment
can, and so it seems does, occur by way of a currency depreciation.10
The Role of Labour Market Integration
The economic significance of the flexibility that Canada would sacrifice by joining a North
11A wide range of possibilities for further Canada-U.S economic integration exists. Some
of them are discussed in the C.D. Howe Institute’s recent Border Papers series. See in particular
Wendy Dobson (2002) and Danielle Goldfarb (2003)
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American Monetary union, or Britain by adopting the Euro for that matter, is a legitimate matter
for debate, not least because this will vary depending upon what other measures, if any, are
simultaneously put in place. The root of the problem under discussion lies after all, not with the
monetary order, but with a lack of labour market flexibility. Perhaps it should be treated as a
labour market problem in the first place, and perhaps indeed it would be so treated in the absence
of the buffer provided by a flexible exchange rate. 
Though this argument deserves respectful attention it also needs to be treated with care.
One benefit that was supposed to flow from the adoption of the Euro by such economies as
France and Germany was the imposition upon them of the discipline needed to bring extra
flexibility to their labour markets. Now, after four years, we can see that this is beginning to
happen, but no one would deny that much still remains to be done. Though argument by analogy
with French and German experience suggests that accession to a monetary union might
encourage greater flexibility in the Canadian labour market, and in the British market too, to the
extent that there are still problems there, it also suggests that it would be unwise to expect too
much too quickly in this regard.
In Europe, we know that the Euro is part of a drive towards the eventual creation of a
single market in goods, services, labour and capital, but the case for North American Monetary
Union has not usually been stated in such terms, or at least not yet. Nevertheless, arguments for
moving the NAFTA in the direction of a fully fledged Customs Union, and for creating greater
labour mobility within North America, along with harmonised immigration and refugee policies,
are now beginning to be heard in Canada, and the removal of restrictions on the free movement
of labour across the Canada-US border would surely remove an important element of the case for
exchange rate flexibility.11 
One reason why exchange rate flexibility is important for Canada is that shocks
emanating from commodity price fluctuations must be absorbed within the domestic labour
market, because there are significant legal barriers to international labour mobility in North
America. Though linguistic and cultural barriers to labour mobility also exist in North America,
they seem, to casual observation at least, to be much less significant there than they are in
Europe, where the legal barriers to international labour mobility are smaller. The removal of
legal barriers to North American labour market integration would thus remove an important
12This seems to be the view, among others, of Courchene and Harris (1999) Cooper
(2001) and Grubel (1998)
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drawback to North American monetary integration, and there seems to exist no similar
opportunity in the case of Britain and the Euro.  There are two ways of stating the implications
of this conclusion. The first is to note that advocates of North American monetary integration
would probably be wise to argue for North American labour market integration as well. The
second is to suggest that those who are skeptical about the desirability of a more general move
towards North American economic integration should probably be wary of supporting monetary
union as a stand alone goal, for the simple reason that the disappearance of exchange rate
flexibility would create a situation in which pressures towards labour market integration would
significantly increase.
Currency Depreciation as a Factor in the Canadian Debate
Canada and the UK are currently operating under broadly similar monetary orders, and from a
purely domestic perspective, outcomes in both countries have been satisfactory. There has been,
however, at least until recently, one salient difference between them. In the 1990s, under
inflation targeting Sterling has been a strong currency internationally, while the Canadian dollar
has depreciated, particularly against the US dollar. In the absence of this latter phenomenon, it is
doubtful that there would now be so much Canadian interest in North American monetary
integration, and certainly it has figured strongly in its proponents’ case.
The first thing to be noted here is that the Canadian dollar’s nominal depreciation began
not in 1991, but in 1976, and that some commentators are inclined to view the currency’s
performance over this period as evidence of a fundamental and long-standing economic
malaise.12 Here, their presentation of the facts is open to question. To begin with, the Canadian
dollar’s nominal depreciation between the mid-1970s and later 1980s is easily accounted for by
the fact that, over those years, the Canadian inflation rate was systematically higher than that of
the US. After its recent rise against the US dollar, moreover, which, at the time of writing, is
beginning to look like more than a temporary aberration, the currency is back at levels that are
actually a little above the lows that it touched in the mid-1980s. It may well turn out, then, that
experience which until recently could be presented as stemming from a serious long-term
problem with the exchange rate that had gotten worse in the 1990s, is better interpreted as an
inflation-induced depreciation that came to an end in the mid-1980s, only to be followed by a
short-lived and unsustainable appreciation that peaked in 1992, after which the currency took
another decade to find its mid-1980s level again. 
13Grubel (1998) in particular made a great deal of these matters. Courchene and Harris
(1999) were careful to refer to the potential effects of the exchange rate regime on business
decision-making as a “conjecture”. 
14Harris (2000) includes a well argued account of this hypothesis.
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But whatever the appearances will turn out to be in the future, by the end of the 1990s,
the dollar’s weakness was being blamed for a variety of  factors affecting the real economy, and
these matters played a major role in the case that began to be made at that time for North
American Monetary Union. Managerial laziness induced by a weak currency was said to be
inhibiting productivity growth, and undisciplined politicians were said to be putting off  hard
decisions because the exchange rate was enabling them to hide the consequences of their
procrastination from the electorate. Neither argument, however, was particularly convincing.13 
There is no doubt that, relative to the US, Canada has, overall experienced a shortfall in
its productivity performance since the early 1990s, but it is now well known that the aggregate
statistics hide the vital detail that significant differences here have been concentrated almost
solely in the “high-tech” sector, which is also a good deal smaller in Canada than in the US. The
exchange rate is a significant variable right across the economy, and it is simply implausible to
attribute so narrowly focussed an effect to its behaviour. As to the resolve of Canadian
politicians during the 1990s, the NAFTA was negotiated and kept in place, inflation was brought
down and kept down, the federal government’s finances were put in order, and those of some
provinces too, a highly unpopular reform of indirect taxation was begun, and a significant reform
of the Employment Insurance was also undertaken. Though there has certainly been back-sliding
on some of these fronts, by international standards, or by those that they themselves set in the
1970s and 1980s, Canadian politicians do not have to apologise for any overall lack of discipline
in the 1990s.
One element in the critics’ commentary on the effects of exchange rate depreciation
nevertheless needs to be taken seriously: the dollar’s decline did make imported investment
goods more expensive, this did inhibit capital accumulation, and this probably did hold back the
growth of productivity in Canada, particularly labour productivity.14 The fundamental force at
work here was, of course, the real exchange rate depreciation that underlay the dollar’s nominal
decline, and how much significance one attaches to it in making the case for the desirability of
monetary integration depends upon the factors to which the nominal and real exchange rate
depreciations in question are attributed. Those who believe that movements in the nominal
exchange rate are largely the consequence of fundamentals that would force the real exchange
15Laidler (forthcoming), which was completed in late 2002, argued that the good
performance of the Bank of Canada equation (See above) in the 1990s put the burden of proof on
squarely on those who denied the importance of economic fundamentals. Since the beginning of
2003, the question has become more open.
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rate to adjust through movements in domestic wages and prices in the absence of exchange rate
flexibility regard this argument as irrelevant to the monetary integration debate, since these
forces would be at work under any monetary regime. Those who believe that the workings of the
foreign exchange market itself can lead to serious and persistent misalignments of the real
exchange rate, on the other hand, regard it as highly pertinent. This is not the place to try to settle
this issue. Suffice it to say, first that disagreement about it is a major factor dividing those who
are skeptical about the likely productivity enhancing effects on Canada of a  common North
American currency, from their opponents; and second that it is at heart an empirical issue on
which the evidence is by no means all in.15       
Political and Institutional Questions
The economic factors discussed so far in this paper do not seem to me to be decisive, one way or
another, to either Canada’s or Britain’s choice of future monetary arrangements. On the one
hand, inflation targeting has worked  well in both countries since the early 1990s, and there has
been nothing about its performance to make a compelling case for either country to give it up.
On the other hand, there are some striking examples of monetary unions among diverse
economic regions that have also worked well for a long time - the United States or indeed
Canada itself - so the advantages of joining such an arrangement cannot be dismissed out of hand
either. For each country, the balance between costs and benefits discussed so far is a fine one,
about which reasonable people can disagree. 
The choice in question should, in any event, be posed as one between monetary orders,
and there is a great deal more to a monetary union than the use of a common currency, which is
the characteristic on which the discussion has focussed so far. Any monetary order also involves,
among other things,  a regulatory and supervisory framework for the banking system and other
financial institutions, a set of institutional arrangements within which monetary policy is
conducted on a day to day basis, not to mention the political mechanisms through which the
goals of monetary policy are chosen, the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy is
managed, and the accountability of policy makers to the public at large is defined and enforced.
When these factors are brought into the picture, it becomes apparent that the nature of the
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choices  facing Britain and Canada are very different.
The European Union, the Euro and Britain’s Choice
The development of the  European Union has been driven from the outset by memories of the
two devastating wars that were fought on continental European soil in the first half of the
twentieth century. Though its earliest stages were dominated by the creation of economic ties
among its members - the Coal and Steel Community, and after the signing of the Treaty of
Rome, a Common Agricultural Policy - European integration has been at heart a political project
from the outset, and the Union’s institutions are those of an embryonic federal (or confederal)
state, albeit not one for which one can find any obvious prototype in previous history. Europe
has a well developed bureaucracy in the shape of the Commission, the electorates of member
states are indirectly represented through the Council, and those electorates also send members to
a European Parliament, albeit one of very limited authority. There is a European Court to which
national courts and legislatures are subservient in a range of areas, while in certain areas, notably
agriculture, international trade, and regional development, policy is made on a European rather
than a national level. 
There is also a common currency for those who want to adopt it, and with it comes a
common monetary policy, set by a European Central Bank, and implemented through a
European System of Central Banks. The ECB derives its political legitimacy from the Maastricht
Treaty, which, while giving it an unusually high degree of independence - the choice of inflation
targets for Europe is a matter for the Bank, not for politicians - , also requires its Governor to
account for his actions on a regular basis to the European Parliament. At the same time, the all-
important interface between fiscal and monetary policy is dealt with, at least in principle, by a
supplementary treaty - the Growth and Stability Pact - which seeks to limit the ability of member
governments to run deficits, and provides for penalties for those who violate them.
The significance of all this for the question at hand is that Britain faces an extremely
clearcut choice in deciding whether or not to adopt the Euro as its currency, because the Euro is
underpinned by an already well defined and fully functioning monetary order. Moreover, the
European Union is a going concern, both economically and politically, and, the currency
question aside, Britain is already fully committed to it and represented within its decision
making bodies on exactly the same terms as any other member nation. Should the Bank of
England become a member of the European System of Central Banks, the interests of the British
public would be taken into account, to exactly the same extent as those of the population of any
other member nation, in monetary policy decisions, and that public would have exactly the same
ability to hold the European Central Bank accountable for its decisions as any other within the
16Issing et al. (2001) provide an accessible and comprehensive survey of the workings of
the new European monetary system. To say that this system is well defined is not to say that it is
necessarily satisfactory in every respect from a British point of view. There is for example
concern in Britain that the ECB has too much goal independence, and it has been suggested that
responsibility for setting inflation targets should be transferred to ECOFIN, a committee of the
Council made up of the finance and economics ministers of member states. The Growth and
Stability Pact has also been criticised for  imposing too much rigidity on fiscal policy. See House
of Commons (2003)  
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system. Furthermore, the European Monetary union was designed on the assumption that Britain
would eventually become a member, and, always presuming that it fulfills the well defined
criteria for accession, there would be no question but that Britain would receive the full co-
operation of its European partners in managing the transition.  
Now, to be sure, there are legitimate concerns about the differences between the
European monetary order and the one currently in place in Britain: both are based on inflation
targets, but in Europe, these are set by central bankers, not elected politicians, and at a
significantly lower level too; monetary policy decisions are taken with much more transparency
in Britain than in Europe; the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in Britain is
managed continuously and at the discretion of politicians, but in Europe, it is subject to
constraints embedded in a treaty that might well turn out in practice to be too rigid to be
enforceable; to name but three of them.16 But with the worrying exception of the Growth and
Stability Pact, which large countries seem to be finding easier to circumvent than small ones, the
rules of the game are the same for all who use the Euro. 
Like that recently made by Sweden, Britain’s choice hinges, as Lars Jonung (2002) has
put it, on the relative amount of trust that the British electorate are willing to invest in the
alternative monetary orders on offer. For Britain to adopt the Euro as its currency would involve
a surrender of national sovereignty in monetary policy, but, subject to the serious caveats just
mentioned, which presumably influenced the outcome of Sweden’s choice,  a degree of
fundamental accountability on the part of monetary policy makers to the British electorate would
be preserved, albeit in a form likely to reduce the responsiveness of policy to their wishes. And
in this matter, they would be treated in exactly the same way as the electorates of any other
country using the Euro. 
The United States, the United States Dollar and Canada’s Choice
The choice between monetary orders that Canada faces is very different, because, although it is
known what is currently in place, it is not clear what form of North American monetary
17The remarks in question were immediately prompted by the possibility of Argentina
dollarizing, but simultaneously seeking access to the Federal Reserve discount window for its
banking system. The wording differs between the two statements in inessential ways.
18The following few paragraphs draw heavily on Robson and Laidler (2002) where their
arguments are developed in more detail. 
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integration is available as an alternative. Other countries have dollarized, some quite recently, on
an essentially unilateral basis, and Canada could, presumably do the same. There already exists a
clear record of  the United States attitude towards such measures. It occurs in statements made
by then Deputy Secretary of the Treasure Laurence Summers in response to monetary
developments in Latin America (Summers 1999a and b), but it uses quite general language, nor
has any element of it been repudiated since.17
“While there are many issues, possibilities and approaches, as these are considered it
would not, in our judgement, by appropriate for United States authorities to adjust their
bank supervisory responsibilities, access to the Federal Reserve discount window, or the
procedures or orientation of U.S. monetary policy in light of another country’s decision
to dollarize its monetary system. Any country contemplating dollarization will have to
weigh carefully these considerations and many others. It will surely be appropriate and
welcome that its representatives do so in consultation with the United States authorities
so that we can jointly think through the implications for both of our economies.” (1999a,
final page, un-numbered)
Applied to Canada, this statement suggests that the United States would like to be consulted if
dollarization is contemplated, and would not necessarily oppose or obstruct such a step. But
crucially, it also says that the United States authorities would not be willing to make any changes
in either the style or substance of their domestic monetary order in order to accommodate
Canadian interests. It is, then, instructive to consider the salient features of a North American
monetary order designed to accommodate such constraints.18
To establish such an order, Canada would have to purchase US currency to replace the
existing stock of Canadian notes and coin in circulation. In round numbers the amount involved
here is about $40 billion, and the interest on the loan needed to raise these funds would eat up
around half of the savings in foreign exchange market transactions costs that dollarization is
expected to realize. The current Canadian regulatory and supervisory framework would
presumably remain in place, and so, therefore would the many incongruities between it and the
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United States regime. Thus, the integration of the North American monetary system beyond the
adoption of a common currency would be inhibited, and the cost savings inherent in the creation
of an integrated financial system would not be fully realised. 
The efficiency of the Canadian financial system would also be impaired under unilateral
dollarization. That is because the Bank of Canada’s ability to create domestically acceptable 
money in unlimited amounts in times of emergency would be given up with the abandonment of
the domestic currency, along with the capacity that this gives the Bank to act as the ultimate
guarantor of the stability of such specific institutions as the Clearing and Settlement system, the
Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation, and of the financial system more generally. Substitute
arrangements would be available under dollarization: the Bank of Canada could, and presumable
would, begin to hold reserves of liquid US dollar assets against its own liabilities, and it would
arrange lines of credit too, probably with the Federal Reserve system itself but also with large
US banks; and financial institutions in Canada’s private sector would do the same. But such a
system would not provide quite as much stability as the one currently in place, and it would be
more costly to operate into the bargain. Canadian based banks would see whatever competitive
edge they now have diminished. There would be an incentive for them to decamp to the US,
where they could avail themselves of the central banking services of the Federal Reserve system
on the same terms as their American competitors, leaving local branches or subsidiaries to
service those among their Canadian clients who for one reason or another could not conveniently
take their own business to the U.S.
There is also the matter of monetary policy itself. It is often suggested that dollarization
of the Canadian economy would lead to Canada importing the inflation rate ruling in the United
States, but that is not true. Rather, in the absence of variations in a nominal exchange rate, the
Canadian price level would have to make whatever moves were needed to bring about any
adjustments in the Canada - US real exchange rate that shifts in market fundamentals dictated.
The extent to which Canada’s vulnerability to such fluctuations could be reduced by measures
designed to promote North American labour market integration has already been discussed, but
at this point, it is worth noting explicitly that even such a development would not be sufficient to
make the price level consequences of unilateral dollarization on Canada’s part similar to those
that would arise for Britain from adopting the Euro. With Britain inside the European monetary
system, the performance of the British economy would  become a matter of concern to the
European Central Bank and would be weighed in its policy decisions, for which the Bank would
be accountable through the European Parliament to, among others, the British public. Under
unilateral dollarization on Canada’s part, monetary policy would be made by a Federal Reserve
system concerned solely with the performance of the U.S. economy, and accountable only to the
19In this context it is worth stressing that Canada has a well developed bond market
where local firms can borrow long-term in local currency. This feature is not always present
even in reasonably advanced economies, for example Spain, Portugal or Greece before their
adoption of the Euro, and can pose a serious obstacle to their smooth functioning under a
completely flexible exchange rate. 
20See for example the important interview with Mr. Cellucci reported in Fife and Toulin
(2001)
21A report of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress dealing with Latin
America (United States 1999) suggested that such aid could be extended to dollarizing countries. 
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U.S. electorate.     
These drawbacks to unilateral dollarization explain why it has been resorted to only by
countries whose own domestic monetary orders have already collapsed, and imply that it is an
extremely unattractive option for a country such as Canada that has a well established and
credible monetary order in place, not to mention an efficient and well functioning financial
system.19 Any North American monetary order that Canada could conceivably find attractive
would, that is to say, have to be a negotiated one, and the preceding discussion provides a
shopping list of what might be sought in such negotiations. Clearly, and as Herbert Grubel
(1998) argued at the very outset of the current debate about Canada’s monetary future, a North
American Monetary Union, overseen by supra-national institutions designed along European
lines could fill the bill here, but equally clearly this option is not available. Not only did
Secretary Summers’ statements exclude this possibility, but so did later remarks by the current
administration’s Ambassador to Canada, Mr. Paul Cellucci. Specifically, though the ambassador
has often expressed support for closer economic integration in North America, he has never, to
the best of my knowledge, mentioned monetary arrangements in this context, and he has also
explicitly denied any interest on the part of the United States in the creation of supra-national
institutions of the European type in any area.20 
Thus, the best that Canada could hope for on the monetary front would be some sort of
integration of the Canadian monetary system into the Federal Reserve system. Any such
integration, however, were it to be anything other than purely symbolic, would require
legislation on both sides of the border. On the U.S. side, there is indirect evidence that Congress
might be willing to help Canada in the matter of covering the costs of currency replacement,
though I suspect that a gift in excess of US$25 billion to Canada would be a hard sell in the
current political climate.21 It is, however, difficult to see any concessions being made that would
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give Canadian representatives a meaningful say in the regulation and oversight of the financial
system or in the conduct of monetary policy, or that would lead to Congress sharing its oversight
of Federal Reserve behaviour with the Parliament of Canada, let alone accepting any limitations
on its powers over the United States budget in the interests of ensuring that the stability of the
North American monetary system be protected from fiscal irresponsibility. There are no United
States interests that would be promoted by any such measures, and some that would be
compromised.
Nor would the integration of Canada’s monetary system into that of the U.S. be plain
political sailing on the Canadian side of the border. To begin with, the prospect of Canada
becoming exposed to the monetary consequences of U.S. fiscal policy, given its current trend,
would cause considerable concern. Furthermore, some very difficult institutional adjustments are
implicit in such a move. To give but one example: in the unlikely event that Congress would
accede to the measure, the conversion of the Bank of Canada into a thirteenth District Bank of
the Federal Reserve System would require, among other measures, that it be privatized, with its
stock being sold to the chartered banks. These institutions would thus acquire the power to
appoint a majority of the Bank’s directors, who in turn would share the responsibility for
appointing its President (formally the Governor) with the authorities in Washington. And this
newly constituted District Bank would also acquire extensive regulatory and supervisory powers
over the Canadian chartered banks which the Bank of Canada does not now possess, these being
exercised at present by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) and the
Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) both of which are creatures of the Department
of Finance, not to mention by the Minister of Finance himself. Simply to spell out  conditions
such as these is to make a compelling case against their political acceptability in Canada.      
In short, the form that North American monetary integration might realistically be
expected to take would differ very little from the unilateral version, unless of course it took place
as a component of an altogether broader movement towards North American economic and
political integration that seems to be on no-one’s political agenda.
Conclusion
The monetary arrangements currently in place in Canada and Britain are reasonably alike, and
are working well, but the alternatives on offer to the two countries are quite different,
particularly in their political aspects. The monetary integration of Britain into Europe would 
involve it in becoming an equal partner in a supra-national monetary order, designed as a
component of a broader supra-national political order of which it is already a member, and which
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is configured (imperfectly no doubt) to treat all of its members on an equal basis, and to ensure
all of them a voice in its current functioning and future evolution. Were Britain to make this
choice, it would surrender national sovereignty in monetary affairs, but it would preserve some
accountability of monetary policy makers to its electorate, albeit less than that electorate is used
to. Monetary integration into North America, on the other hand, would involve Canada giving up
both national sovereignty and every shred of political accountability on the part of policy makers
to its electorate. In seeking such a change, Canada would in effect be offering hegemony over
the most important single component of its domestic macroeconomic policy to the government
of the United States. To the best of my knowledge, the United States have neither the ambition to
establish such hegemony, nor any interest in having it thrust upon them, and Canadians would be
wise to take such schemes off their agenda. There are many more important and pressing matters
to which the country’s scarce political energy could better be devoted.   
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